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June 30, 1985
To Member Firms of the SEC Practice Section,
Securities and Exchange Commission, and
Other Interested Parties
It is my pleasure to transmit this seventh annual report of the Public Oversight Board.
The 1984-85 year was one in which continued progress was made by the accounting profession in its
self-regulatory program. The successful peer review program was further strengthened through
modification of standards and procedures. More significantly, the Section offered the SEC access
through the offices of the Board to information on cases closed by the Special Investigations
Committee. While details have not been completed, the Board hopes that such access will provide
the SEC a basis to form an independent opinion and endorse the special investigative process in
much the same way as it has endorsed the peer review process.
The past year, however, also saw a significant increase in the number of allegations of failure in
audits, especially in audits of financial institutions. These highly publicized cases were in large part
responsible for the initiation of Congressional hearings regarding the credibility of financial
statements and the auditor’s report thereon. The Board does not believe that additional federal
regulation of the accounting profession is necessary and so testified during those hearings.
Nevertheless, the events of the past year suggest that the profession cannot become complacent
with the success the self-regulatory program has achieved to date but must closely examine all
aspects of the program in the light of recent events. Our report includes a number of suggestions
which we have communicated to the Section, including the need to increase public awareness of
the program and to educate the public regarding the difference between a business failure and an
audit failure. The Board has full confidence, based on the commitment to self-regulation already
evidenced by the Section and its members, that whatever is necessary to be done to strengthen
the program will in fact be done.
Very truly yours,

A r th ur M. W o o d

Chairman

Public Oversight Board
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Report on the Board's
1984-85 Oversight Activities
the operation of the Section and to publish an
n setting up its self-regulatory pro
gram for accounting firms— described
annual report and any such other reports as it may
deem necessary with respect to its activities and
briefly in the accompanying box en
those of the Section.
title d "The Accounting Profession’s
Self-Regulatory Program"— the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and those
Role of the Board
with statutory oversight believed it essential that
The role of the Board is to represent the
a process organized and administered by the pro
public interest and to assure that this is not ne
fession be subjected to oversight and review by
glected when the Section sets standards, mem
an independent body representing the public
bership requirements, and rules and procedures.
interest. Thus, provision was made for a board of
The Board does not believe that its com
five experienced and independent individuals
mitment to the public interest places it in conflict
not engaged in independent public accounting to
with the best interests of the accounting profes
oversee the operations of the SEC Practice Section
sion. The accounting profession serves the public
(SECPS). Brief biographies of Board members ap
interest in a particular manner— the enhance
pear on pages 26-29.
ment of the cre d ib ility of financial statements
Initially, members of the Public Oversight
which issuers and debtors prepare and which in
Board (POB) were appointed by the Board of
vestors and creditors, as well as governmental
Directors of the AICPA and it was intended that
authorities, rely upon. The Board, and the pro
their replacements would be so appointed. How
gram which it oversees, exist to give additional
ever, to further assure its independence, a change
assurance that the accounting profession per
was made in 1978 to give the POB the right to
forms, and is perceived to perform, the role which
appoint its own successors in consultation with
society accords it. Unless the accounting profes
and subject to the approval of the AICPA Board of
sion satisfies society that it is performing this role,
Directors. After further consideration, in 1985, an
society will seek other means of giving financial
other change was made so that the POB now acts
information the reliability needed in an economy
independently on its own appointments, com
which
relies upon credit and private investors for
pensation, and all other decisions. As Chairman
its viability.
Wood told the AICPA Council in May 1985,1 how
The Board does not have line authority.
ever, the changes were not required because the
Nevertheless,
the Board and its staff have played
Board and its individual members have always
major
roles
in
the
development and refinement of
felt completely independent.
the policies, standards, and operations of the Sec
tion. In addition, it has influenced the develop
Responsibilities and Functions
ment of professional standards. Some of the
The Board is charged with the respon
Board's major contributions during the past year
sibility for monitoring and evaluating the activities
are identified in other sections of this report.
and decisions of the Section’s committees and
conducting continuous oversight of all other ac
Activities of the Board
tivities of the Section. It also has responsibilities
to make recommendations for improvement in
The Board actively monitors all aspects of

I

1. See Exhibit I for full text of Chairman Wood's address to the Spring M eeting of
AICPA Council, Scottsdale, Arizona, May, 1985.
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the self-regulatory program administered by the
Section. The Board is assisted by a staff of four
CPAs and two administrative personnel. Richard A.
Stark, a partner in the New York law firm of
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, has served as
the Board’s legal counsel since its inception.
The Board meets monthly to consider is
sues as they arise and to review events since the
last meeting.

Congressional Hearings
In February 1985, the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations of the House Com
mittee on Energy and Commerce, chaired by Rep
resentative John D. Dingell (D., Mich.) began a
series of hearings on "Oversight of the Accounting
Profession and the Securities and Exchange Com
mission: Effectiveness, Independence, and Regu-

The Accounting Profession's Self-Regulatory Program
During the course of the Congressional hearings on
the accounting profession in 1977 and 1978, concern
was expressed about, among other things, the quality
of the auditing services provided by public accounting
firms in this country. In response to these concerns, in
1977 the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants created a new organization to improve
the quality of service provided by these firms— a
Division for CPA Firms consisting of two sections, an
SEC Practice Section and a Private Companies Practice
Section.2
■ Membership Requirements. Firms that join either
section commit themselves to adhere to rigorous
membership requirements, including peer review and
continuing professional education. The SECPS also
has requirements regarding partner rotation and
second partner review on audits of public companies,
the reporting to the Section of litigation and govern
ment action alleging failure in the conduct of an audit
of a publicly-held company and the reporting of
serious disagreements with management to the client
company’s board of directors.
A fundamental membership requirement of both
sections is that firms commit themselves to adhere to
quality control standards enunciated by the AICPA,
which assure that member firms meet high profes
sional standards in all aspects of their accounting and
auditing practice.
■ Levels of Regulation of Accountants. The peer
regulatory program administered by the Division for
CPA Firms is but one facet of the overall regulatory
program of the AICPA, which includes, among other
activities, the setting of ethical, auditing, and quality
control standards. Regulation of professional practice
is applied at two other levels: by individual account
ing firms and by government. These three levels of
regulation use means commensurate with their differ
ing purposes and powers to achieve their common
goal of enhanced audit quality. Together, the three

2. The nature and scope of the accounting profession's self-regulatory program
and the way in which the program combines with other regulatory efforts is

provide a coordinated program of regulation of
accountants and accounting.
Individual accounting firms provide the first line
of defense against unsatisfactory audit practice. First,
they establish internal systems of quality control
designed to ensure compliance with professional
standards and, if applicable, SEC rules and other legal
requirements in the conduct of their accounting and
auditing practice. Second, they establish programs of
internal inspection to ascertain possible failures of
compliance with their systems of quality control.
Third, they take disciplinary and remedial steps
against partners and staff members judged to be
inadequate in performance of their professional
responsibilities.
Regulation imposed by the government includes
qualifying examinations, licensing provisions and
other regulatory requirements to assure reliable
service by accountants to the public. The government
has the final authority to punish accountants who fail
to comply with legal standards of performance and
does so through imposition of punitive measures such
as public censure, injunction, and temporary or
permanent suspension from practice before the SEC
or by state licensing boards. In addition, civil litigation
pursued within the government’s legal system may
result in damage awards against auditors which are
often substantial in amount.
In contrast to the roles played by government
regulation and private regulation, peer regulation by
the AICPA Division for CPA Firms is not directed to
identifying, convicting, and punishing those who fail to
meet established requirements; rather, it is preven
tive in nature. In line with its powers and authority, it
focuses on strengthening systems of quality control
and improving the effective performance of member
firms through reviews to discover whether they
comply with membership requirements, ethical stan
dards, and professional standards.

more fully described in Audit Quality. The Profession's Program published in 1984
by the Public Oversight Board.
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lation of Corporate Audits.”
Board Chairman Wood and Board Vice
Chairman Sommer presented written and oral tes
timony to the Committee in April, explaining the
Section’s self-regulatory program and the Board’s
oversight thereof.
The hearings are expected to continue at
least until the fall of 1985. As Chairman Wood
reported to the Committee: "We are observing
closely your hearings. From them, we hope to gain
further insights into the circumstances that have
caused the perception in many quarters that there
are deficiencies in the audit process in this coun
try. Out of these insights we expect to develop
new procedures and safeguards to further reduce
the possibility of 'bad’ audits occurring, notwith
standing the earnest efforts of us and so many
m em bers of the accounting profession to
strengthen the quality of audits and the systems
of quality control that have been welded together
for many years, especially the last eight.” 3

Oversight of the Peer Review Process
The Board monitors the activities of the
Peer Review Committee, including reports on in
dividual peer reviews as well as the setting of,
revisions to, and enforcement of standards. Mem
bers of the Board and its staff attended each of the
seven full-day meetings held by the Committee,
eight meetings of its Evaluations and Recom
mendations Subcommittee, and seven full-day
meetings held by its various task forces. In addi
tion, the Board’s staff reviews every peer review
perform ed; it attends many of the exit con
ferences— the meeting at the conclusion of a peer
review when the reviewers report their findings
and recommendations to management of the re
viewed firm— and members of the Board also
periodically attend such meetings. Any problem
the staff has with the conduct of a review or a re
port— if they think it is too harsh or too lenient— is
brought to the attention of the Board. While the
Board does not have the power to overrule a
decision of the authorities in the Section, the
Board’s experience has been that the Section re
considers its decision when the Board makes its
views known. The Section often adopts the
Board’s recommendations. In other cases, the
Board accepts the logic of the position taken by
3. Testimony on Behalf of the Public Oversight Board before the Subcommittee
on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce, March 6, 1985.

the Section.
Each review is subjected to one of three
levels of Board oversight: (1) observing the per
formance of the field work, attending the exit
conference and reviewing the review team ’s
workpapers, report, letter of comments, and the
reviewed firm’s letter of response; (2) reviewing
CHART A.

Scope of Board Oversight of 1984 Peer Reviews
Classified by Number of SEC Clients of Reviewed
Firms
No. of Firms

Percent
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the review team’s workpapers, the report, and the
letters issued; or (3) reviewing selected reviewers’
workpapers, the report, and the letters issued.
During the past year, the Board observed reviews
in process for all firms with five or more SEC
clients and, based on selected criteria, visited a
number of firms with fewer than five SEC clients
and a representative number of firms with no SEC
clients. Chart A summarizes this phase of the
Board’s oversight.
The Board finds its access to the peer re
view activities of the Section entirely satisfactory
for discharge of its oversight responsibilities. Dis
cussion at Committee meetings is free and frank,
and Board members and its staff have adequate
opportunity to express their views and to receive
responses to such expressions. The Board is con
vinced that the peer review program is functioning
effectively and accomplishing the purposes for
which intended.

Oversight of the Special Investigative Process
The other major element of the Section’s
program is the special investigative process. A
member firm is obligated to report promptly to
the Special Investigations Committee (SIC) litiga
tion and governmental proceedings directed
against it that allege deficiencies in the conduct of
an audit of a client in which there is a significant
public interest, defined, generally speaking, as a
client that files financial statements with the SEC
or certain other federal regulatory agencies in
connection with the sale or trading of its securities.
As with the peer review activity of the Sec
tion, the Board and its staff actively monitor all
activities of the Special Investigations Committee
and its task forces. The Board has unrestricted
access to all Committee meetings and files. Mem
bers of the Board’s staff read, for each reported
case, all pertinent financial statements, other pub
lic documents, related correspondence, and rele
vant professional literature. For each reported
case, Board members receive a copy of a summary
of the allegations, which identifies the accounting,
auditing, and quality control issues involved and
applicable professional standards, as well as
information and comments developed by the
Board’s staff in carrying out its oversight functions.
These papers serve as the basis for questions and

discussion at Board meetings.
Members of the Board and its staff at
tended each of the seven full-day meetings held
by the Committee during the year and attended
most of the 30 meetings held by SIC task forces
with firm representatives to discuss allegations in
reported cases or with peer reviewers to discuss
peer review findings that may have been relevant
to allegations made in reported cases. Addi
tionally, during 1984-85, the Board’s staff evaluated
the activities of the two SIC task forces and review
teams that performed special reviews. The staff
also visited the offices of the two member firms
being reviewed during the course of the special
reviews, reviewed the workpapers prepared in
connection therewith, discussed the findings and
their quality control implications with appropriate
parties, and attended meetings at which the find
ings of the review team were communicated to
representatives of the reviewed firm.
Based on its extensive monitoring, the
Board concludes that the Committee has effective
operational procedures, and that the Committee’s
decisions are well-reasoned and in the interest of
the public and the profession.
The Board is concerned that the special
investigative process has not yet achieved cred
ibility equal to that attained by the peer review
process. This is largely due to the confidentiality
of the Committee’s activities rather than to any
weakness in its purpose or procedures. Because
of concern for possible prejudice to both plaintiffs
and defendants in private and governmental pro
ceedings, the Section determined that details of
the Committee’s proceedings and conclusions on
individual cases would not be publicly disclosed.
Consistent with the Section’s concerns, the Board
only reports aggregate information about the ac
tivities of this Committee.

Summary
The Public Oversight Board was estab
lished by the American Institute of Certified Pub
lic Accountants as a means of giving further
assurance that the quality control requirements
imposed by it on firms which voluntarily chose to
subject themselves to those requirements were
met. The Board, consisting of five members, none
of whom is engaged in the practice of accounting
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and three of whom have had no professional asso
ciation with the accounting profession, has estab
lished a program to oversee the quality control
efforts of the Section. The Board believes that this
program is effectively designed to accomplish its
purpose. Based upon its oversight of the work
done under that program, the Board has con
cluded that during the 1985 fiscal year the quality
control program was effectively implemented and
that it provided significant assurance that firms
participating in the program had in place, and
complied with, quality control systems which pro
vide reasonable assurance that audits would be
done in accordance with generally accepted audit
ing standards.

This is not to say, of course, that a program
less than a decade old cannot be improved. As
indicated in what follows, the Board and others
have identified improvements which should be
considered. We are confident that those respon
sible for the implementation of the program
will make the changes that are necessary to
strengthen the program and provide even greater
asssurance that the audits of publicly-held com
panies and other companies of public concern are
conducted in accordance with the highest prac
ticable standards.

Board members discussing annual report for 1984-85. Left to right. Vice Chairm an A. A. Sommer, Jr., Robert K. Mautz, Board counsel Richard A. Stark, Chairm an A rth u r M .
Wood, John D. Harper, and Melvin R. Laird.
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Peer Review Activity

I

n calendar 1984, 167 member firms
were required to undergo a peer re
view; of these, 136 were firms that had
previously been peer reviewed and
31 were firms that submitted their quality control
system to peer review for the first time. One re
view was a full-scope review performed prior to
the expiration of the affected firm’s normal threeyear cycle, because the previous review had dis
closed quality control system deficiencies requir
ing extensive corrective action by the firm. One
hundred fifty-three peer review reports were ac
cepted by the Committee as of June 30, 1985.
Processing of the reports on the remaining 14
reviews was deferred pending resolution of cer
tain matters to the satisfaction of the Committee
or its staff.
The peer review process is detailed in the
box on page 12.

improvement over results of reviews performed
in 1981.
CHART B.

Percent

Types of Reports Issued on 203 Peer Reviews Per
formed in 1981 and on 167 Peer Reviews Per
formed in 1984
1981

1984

Types of Reports Issued
As indicated in Chart B, over 90 percent of
the firms reviewed in 1984 received an unqualified
opinion, the majority of which were accompanied
by a letter of comments. As in past years, firms
receiving an unqualified opinion without a letter
of comments are firms with a limited accounting
and auditing practice for which a relatively simple
system of quality control is appropriate. Approx
imately 8 percent of the firms reviewed in 1984
received qualified opinions and two of the reports
issued on 1984 reviews were adverse. Reports on
all reviews completed in 1984 are included in
Chart B classified by the type of report issued by
the reviewer and/or based upon the preliminary
evaluation made by the Committee’s and POB's
staffs of the peer reviewer’s findings.
The m ajority of firms reviewed in 1984
were also reviewed in 1981 under the three-year
rotation policy. As indicated in Chart B, results of
reviews performed in 1984 indicated a substantial

An analysis of the types of reports re
ceived by the 136 firms peer reviewed in both 1981
and 1984 shows that 115 firms received the same
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type of report in 1984 as they did in 1981, 15 firms
received a better report, and six firms received a
more critical report in 1984. Comparison of the
letters of comments for 1981 and 1984 indicates
that most, if not all, of the firms that received
unqualified reports both in 1981 and 1984 also had
improved their quality control systems in the
three-year period. The number, nature, and fre
quency of deficiencies reported in 1984 letters of
comments were considerably less than those re
ported in 1981. However, it is our belief, based on
our oversight program, that reviewers have gradu
ally increased the rigor of their examinations over

the years. Details are shown in Table 1.
The one firm that received adverse opin
ions on its 1981 and 1984 reviews was requested by
the Committee to take specified corrective ac
tions in 1984, including the engaging of a qualified
person, acceptable to the Committee, to perform
preissuance reviews of audit workpapers and re
ports. The firm has refused to do so, and the
Committee has initiated proceedings to impose
formal sanctions on the firm.
In another case, a firm initially refused to
undergo an accelerated review as a condition of
continued membership in the Section and steps

The Peer Review Process
Peer review is the cornerstone of the profession’s selfregulatory program. Once every three years a member
firm must have the quality control system for its
accounting and auditing practice reviewed and pub
licly reported on by an independent third party. The
public report on an accounting firm’s system of quality
control may be unqualified, qualified, or adverse.
The review may be conducted by another mem
ber firm, by a team appointed by the Peer Review
Committee, by a team assembled by an association of
CPA firms to which the reviewed member firm
belongs, or by a team assembled by a state CPA
society. To qualify to administer peer reviews for its
members, an association must have its administrative
plan approved by the Peer Review Committee and
have any common quality control items such as
manuals and educational programs reviewed by an
independent third party. Similarly, a state CPA society
must have its administrative plan approved by the
Committee. Currently, 10 associations and one state
CPA society are authorized to administer peer reviews
for members belonging to the SEC Practice Section.
A review covers the operations of a firm’s
accounting and auditing practice over a one-year
period. An unqualified report is issued when the
reviewer concludes that the firm's quality control
system is sufficiently comprehensive and suitably
designed to meet the objectives of quality control
standards and that its quality control policies and
procedures were complied with during the year, thus
providing the firm with reasonable assurance of
conforming with professional standards.
A qualified report is issued when the reviewer
concludes that there are significant deficiencies in the
design of the firm’s quality control system, a signifi
cant lack of compliance with its quality control
policies and procedures, or a significant lack of
compliance with membership requirements of the
Section.

An adverse report is issued when the reviewer
concludes that the firm’s quality control system is not
sufficiently comprehensive or that its policies and
procedures are not being complied with in a manner
that provides the firm with reasonable assurance that
it is complying with professional standards.
A substantial majority of firms receiving un
qualified reports and all firms receiving qualified or
adverse reports also receive letters of comments
which report (1) deficiencies noted in the firm’s
quality control system or in compliance by the firm’s
personnel with its quality control policies and pro
cedures and (2) recommendations for corrective
action. The recommended corrective actions in a
letter of comments issued with an unqualified report
are intended to improve the effectiveness of the
firm’s quality control system or compliance by its
personnel with its quality control policies and pro
cedures, but the identified deficiencies are not
considered to be so serious as to negate the
conclusion that the firm’s system provides it with
reasonable assurance of complying with professional
standards in the performance of its accounting and
auditing engagements.
A firm is required to respond in writing to each
item in the letter of comments stating the specific
actions the firm has taken or intends to take with
respect to each item listed or giving its reason for not
doing so.
The Committee reviews the findings and the
report issued on each review to ascertain whether the
review was performed and reported on in accordance
with standards and whether the reviewed firm is
responsive to the reviewer’s findings and rec
ommendations. If the Committee is satisfied with the
report and the letters of comments and response, the
report is accepted and it and the letters are placed in
a file available for public inspection.
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TABLE 1

Comparison of Reports Received by Firms Peer Re
viewed Both in 1981 and 1984
Number of Firms by Type of Report
Received in 1984

Number of Firms by
Type of Report
Received in 1981

Unqualified

Unqualified....... 117

Qualified Adverse

111

6

Q ualified ...........

16

13

3

Adverse.............

3

1

1

136

125

another member firm, or an association or state
CPA society authorized by the Committee to do
so. A comparison of the types of review teams in
1984 and 1981 indicates a trend toward selecting a
member firm to perform a review rather than to
request the Committee to appoint a team to do
so. Over 61 percent of the firms undergoing re
views in 1981 were reviewed by a committeeappointed review team (CART), whereas only 26
percent of 1984 reviews were perform ed by
CARTs. Forty-five percent of 1984 reviews were
performed by member firms as shown in Chart C.
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leading to the possible imposition of a sanction
were initiated. Such plans were cancelled when
the firm in question submitted to the accelerated
review mandated by the Committee. The report
issued on the mandated review was unqualified
since the firm had made the required improve
ments in its quality control system.
As in past years, the Committee and its
staff vigorously and equ itably enforced the
rigorous standards for performing and reporting
on peer reviews. In this connection, the Commit
tee deferred acceptance of 45 reports upon initial
consideration. The primary reasons for deferral of
action were:
■ The sample of engagements reviewed did not
represent a reasonable cross-section of the firm's
accounting and auditing practice; the reviewer
was required to revisit the firm and review addi
tional engagements.
■ The type of report and letter of comments is
sued were not consistent with the deficiencies
noted in the course of the review; the reviewer
was asked to change the report and/or letter or to
justify the type of report and letter issued.
■ Questions were unresolved as to whether one
or more of the auditing engagements reviewed
had been performed in compliance with profes
sional standards; the reviewed firm was required
to resolve such matters as a condition precedent
to the processing of the report by the Committee.

Types of Reviewers
A firm can request that its review be per
formed by a team assembled by the Committee,

Substandard Performance on Individual
Engagements
The Committee also deals with instances
of substandard auditing and accounting perfor
mance discovered on individual engagements
during the peer review process. These are re
ported promptly to the Committee. The Board’s
staff found reviewers diligent in pursuing in
stances of noncom pliance with generally ac
cepted accounting principles (GAAP) and gen
erally accepted auditing standards (GAAS).
During 1984, peer reviewers reviewed the
financial statements, reports, and workpapers for
1,162 audit engagements, including audits of 260
SEC registrants. Nineteen of these— or 1.6 percent
of the number reviewed— were deemed to be
substandard in the application of GAAP or GAAS;
two of the nineteen were audits of SEC registrants.
In all five cases the financial statements
were deemed not to have been prepared in accor
dance with GAAP, the auditing firm immediately
recalled its report and the financial statements
and/or auditor’s report were reissued. None of
these were SEC engagements.
In each instance where the peer reviewers
concluded and the firm concurred that the audit
had not been performed in accordance with
GAAS, the firm either immediately performed the
procedures that were considered necessary but
not performed during the course of the audit or,
because the next annual audit was imminent,
agreed to perform such procedures in that audit.
The unusually large number of non-GAAS engage
ments not yet resolved to the satisfaction of the
Committee is due to unusual circumstances; three
of the engagements were performed by the firm
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CHART C.

Types of Reviewers in 1981 and 1984

1984 Reviews

1981 Reviews

124
(61%)

75
(45%)

48
(29%)

44
(26%)

41
(

20% )

Reviews performed by com
mittee-appointed-review
teams (CARTs)

38
( 19%)

Reviews performed by an
SECPS member firm se
lected by the reviewed firm

against which the Committee has initiated sanc
tion proceedings and four were performed by a
firm whose adverse peer review report has not yet
been processed by the Committee. In addition,
the firms involved are no longer engaged as au
ditor on three of these clients, including the SEC
registrant. Details are shown in Table 2.
In each instance where substandard work
was detected, the peer reviewer had to consider
whether the firm’s quality control system failed to
include policies and procedures that should have
prevented the substandard work (a system de
sign deficiency) or whether the substandard work
resulted from noncompliance with existing pol
icies and procedures (a "people problem” ) and
then recommend appropriate remedial measures
in a letter of comments.
The 19 non-GAAP/non-GAAS engagements
were performed by 10 different firms. Six of these
firms received either a modified or adverse report
because of the gravity of the deficiencies in their
quality control systems. The four other firms re
ceived unqualified reports with a letter of com-

TABLE 2

Reviews performed under
approved program admin
istered by an association of
CPA firms or state CPA society

Corrective Action Required By SECPS Peer Review
Committee with Respect to Substandard Audit
Engagements Identified in Reviews Performed in
1984
Number of Engagements
Total

SEC

Non-SEC

Number of audit
engagements reviewed . .

1,162

260

Number of audit
engagements considered
substandard by peer
reviewers........................

.....19

2

17

1.6 %

0.8%

1.9%

Audit report recalled and
financial statements and/
or report reissued...........

5

0

5

Omitted auditing
procedures performed . . .

7

1

6

Omitted auditing
procedures— firm has not
yet informed Committee
of actions to be taken. . . .

7

1

6

902

Corrective Actions Required

15

merits, because the reviewers concluded that the
substandard work did not result from a system
deficiency but rather from isolated noncom
pliance by the firm's personnel. The Board and its
staff closely reviewed each such instance in order
to obtain assurance that an unqualified report was
appropriate in the circumstances.

Additional Requirements Imposed by the
Committee
During the year, the Committee took vari
ous actions to obtain assurance that firms were
effectively implementing corrective action plans
in situations where the peer review had surfaced
serious quality control deficiencies. Such actions
required and monitored by the Committee con
sisted of:
■ Revisits to 13 firms by the peer reviewer or a
Committee member to assess the effectiveness of
the firm’s corrective actions.
■ Obtaining copies from 16 firms of their annual
inspection report and, in the case of three multi
office firms, copies of the reports issued in con
nection with inspection of certain of the firm’s
individual practice units to assess the effec
tiveness of the firm’s corrective action plans.
■ Requiring appointment, by each of three firms,
of a qualified person acceptable to the Committee
to direct the firm’s quality control program and to
have such director periodically report results to
the Committee; additionally, one such consultant
was to perform a preissuance review on each audit
of a public interest client.
The Committee also dealt effectively with
substandard performance by peer reviewers, in
cluding reviewing firms. As a case in point, the
Committee concluded that review teams ap
pointed by one firm for three peer reviews it was
engaged to conduct did not perform the assigned
reviews in accordance with standards. In response
to being so advised by the Committee, the firm
submitted a detailed plan for use by its personnel
to assure that any future review engagements ac
cepted by the firm would be performed and re
ported on in accordance with standards. The
Committee accepted the plan subject to satisfac
tory implementation.

Monitoring of MAS Engagements
Member firms are required to report cer
tain information regarding fees received for man
agement advisory services (MAS) engagements,
including MAS fees received from SEC registrants
for whom the firm serves as auditor. Such informa
tion is reported in the firm's annual report which is
placed in the firm's public file. Analysis of the data
reveals that for 97 percent of the SEC registrants
audited by member firms, the firm either did not
perform an MAS engagement for the registrant in
1984, or, if it did so, the MAS fee was less than 26
percent of the audit fee. Details are shown in
Table 3; additional analyses of MAS fees are
shown on pages 24-25.
TABLE 3

Analysis of Ratio of MAS Fees to Audit Fees Received
in 1984 from SEC Registrants
INumber of SEC Audit Clients Classified by
Percent of MAS Fee to Audit Fee

Number of Firms
Classified by
Number of
SEC Clients

0-25%*

26-50%

Firms ( 11) with
100 or more SEC
audit clients ....

10,741

184

562

Firms (11) with
20 to 99 SEC
audit clients ....
Firms (169) with
fewer than 20
SEC audit clients
Totals
Percents

Over
100%

Total

99

105

11,129

9

5

1

577

470
11,773

26
219

3
106

107

499
12,205

96.5%

1.8%

0.9%

0.9%

100%

51-100%

0

*The Board has suggested that 0% be made a discrete category in future annual
reports filed by m em ber firms to make future analyses of these data more
useful and less subject to m isinterpretation.

The Section has been sensitive to critics
who allege that performance of MAS engagements
impairs auditor independence. Peer review stan
dards require a team reviewing a firm that per
forms both audit and MAS engagements for one or
more SEC registrants to perform appropriate tests
of whether the firm has:
■ Made objective accounting, auditing, and re
porting decisions in performing the audit.
■ Complied with independence rules embodied
in the AICPA Code of Ethics and its Statements on
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Standards for Management Advisory Services
when performing MAS engagements.
■ Complied with the proscriptions relating to the
performance of stipulated types of MAS engage
ments.
■ Complied with the requirement to report to the
audit committee or board of directors the amount
of MAS fees received and the nature of services
performed.
The perform ance of such procedures
throughout the seven-year history of peer review
has not brought forth any evidence (a) that serving
in an MAS capacity has diluted a firm’s objectivity
in performance of the audit function, or (b) that
proscribed services have been performed.

Continuing Modification of Peer Review
Standards and Procedures
A number of improvements were made in
the peer review process during the year, several in
response to suggestions made by the Board. The
changes, which are expected to further enhance
the quality of peer review performance and re
porting, include measures dealing with:
■ The qualifications of reviewing firms and team
captains.
■ The reporting implications of deficient offices in
a multioffice firm in which firm-wide compliance is
otherwise acceptable.
■ The resolution of disagreements between a re
view team and the Committee.
■ The consideration that should be given to litiga

tion in selecting engagements for review.
■ Increasing consistency in the evaluation of and
reporting on deficiencies discovered in peer
reviews.
In addition, the Board has recommended
that peer review reports include a reference to
related letters of comments, when these exist, and
that additional consideration be given to clarifying
the purpose and extent of second partner review
and the responsibilities of those performing this
function. Both of these matters are under consid
eration by the Section as of the date of this report.
A Joint Task Force on Uniformity of Report
ing, consisting of members of the Peer Review
Committees of both sections, has held several
meetings, all of which have been attended by
Board staff, and is in the process of developing
proposals to the respective committees regarding
revisions to and clarification of existing standards
and guidelines.

SEC Oversight of the Process
The SEC independently evaluates the
peer review process of the Section, including the
effectiveness of Board oversight. The SEC staff has
begun its inspection of the 1984 reviews but has
not yet concluded its inspection since its sample
of reviews selected for such inspection has not yet
been fully processed by the Committee. The
Board understands that the SEC staff has indi
cated that it is satisfied with both peer review and
oversight performance on the reviews inspected
to date.
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Activities of the
Special Investigations Com m ittee
s a result of a recommendation emanat
A
ing from an intensive review of the
structure and operations of the Sec
tion by a special review committee of
accountants and nonaccountants (the SECPS Spe
cial Review Committee), the Section published in
May 1985 its first Report on the Activities of the Special
Investigations Committee of the SEC Practice Section of the
AICPA Division for CPA Firms. The Board believes
this report increases the awareness of how the
special investigative process operates— de
scribed in the accompanying box entitled "The
Special Investigative Process"— and what that
part of the profession’s self-regulatory program
has accomplished, and encourages the Section to
publish comprehensive annual reports covering
all its activities.

Cases Reported
Member firms reported 46 new cases dur
ing the year ended June 30, 1985. In addition, the
Committee reopened its files on one case pre
viously closed because of new developments in
the case. A summary of the Committee’s activity
during the year is shown in Table 4.
In April 1985, the Executive Committee
amended the membership requirements so that
member firms are now required to report litiga
tion alleging failure in the conduct of an audit of
selected non-SEC clients. Details are reported on
pages 21 and 22.

Special Reviews
Based upon its analysis of data gathered in the
initial investigative stage, the Committee re
quired two firms to submit to a special review. The
review of each firm focused on engagements per
formed by the personnel involved in the reported
case and on certain types of engagements per-

TABLE 4

Special Investigations Committee Activity During
the Year Ended tune 30, 1985
Number of Cases
Undergoing
Initial

Status of cases
at July 1, 1984......................

Undergoing

Investigative

In

Procedures

Monitoring

14

6

Special
Review

6

Activity during the year:
New cases a d d e d .......
Case reopened...........

46
1

Cases transferred to:
M onitoring...............
Special re v ie w .......
Cases c lo se d ...............
Status of cases
at June 30, 1985 .................

( 11)

11

( 2)
(27)

( 7)

21

10

2

2

formed by that office for clients in the same
industry.
On one of the special reviews, the Commit
tee’s task force appointed a review team com
posed of experienced professionals drawn from
several member firms. On the other special re
view, the Committee’s task force used the firm that
had served as the peer reviewer for the subject
firm. The scope of each review was determined by
the Committee's assigned task force. The mem
bers of both review teams had extensive review
experience within their individual firms, recent
experience in the peer review process, expert
knowledge of quality control systems, and exper
tise in the industries of the engagements selected
for review. Both review teams performed under
the direct on-site supervision of the task force
assigned to the case. As of June 30, 1985, both
special reviews were still in process.
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Corrective Actions of Firms
Typically, a firm which has been named as a

defendant in private or governmental litigation
undertakes on its own initiative a review of the
engagement alleged not to have been performed

The Special Investigative Process
Member firms are required to report to the Special
Investigations Committee each instance of litigation or
proceeding (case) against them or members of their
firms involving allegations of failure in the conduct of
an audit of the financial statements of an SEC
registrant or a bank or other lending institution filing
periodic reports with other federal regulatory agen
cies. The Committee reviews the allegations in each
case and considers whether they may indicate a need
for improvements in the quality control system of the
reporting firm or improved compliance with its quality
control policies and procedures. Additionally, the
Committee analyzes reported cases to ascertain
whether changes in professional standards are
required.
■ Investigative Phases. The activities of the Commit
tee consist of two distinct phases: an initial
investigative phase and a special review phase. The
initial investigative phase includes review of relevant
public documents, discussions with appropriate rep
resentatives of the accounting firm named in the
litigation and other activities necessary to assess the
implications of the allegations for the firm’s system of
quality control. If future developments relating to the
case are expected, such as the issuance of a report for
a peer review in process, the issuance of a bankruptcy
trustee’s report, or an action by a regulatory enforce
ment agency, the files on the case are kept open in
order to follow and evaluate such future
developments.
A special review is a review of certain aspects
of a firm’s quality control system, such as audit
engagements performed for clients in a given industry,
or engagements performed by a particular office or
individual, or a specific element of the firm’s quality
control system. Such a review involves application of
procedures similar to those used in peer review. The
Section requires that the cost of a special review be
borne by the reviewed firm.
The objective of both phases is to reduce the
possibility of future failure by (1) ascertaining whether
deficiencies exist in the firm’s quality control system
as alleged and (2) if so, requiring the firm to take
appropriate corrective action.
■ Operation of the Committee. For each reported
case, the member firm is required to provide the
Committee with copies of the complaint, relevant
financial statements, SEC or other regulatory filings,
and, if requested, other relevant public documents.
The staff of the Committee prepares a summary of
the submitted data, identifying and evaluating the

accounting, auditing, and quality control issues in
volved. Copies of all documents are sent to members
assigned to the case and the staff summary is sent to
all Committee members.
One or more Committee members are assigned
by the chairman as a task force to analyze the
complaint and other relevant documents to deter
mine whether the situation suggests that there might
be a shortcoming in the quality control system of the
firm and to make recommendations to the Committee
as to the action that should be taken. The task force
applies the relevant prescribed initial investigative
procedures designed to assist it in considering the
nature of the allegations and their implications. In
some cases, analysis of the complaint and the
financial statements to which it relates permits the
task force and Committee to conclude that the
allegations are without merit. Many complaints, while
stating legitimate claims against issuers, fall short, for
a number of reasons, of stating a reasonable claim
against the auditor, most stemming from a misunder
standing of the scope of audit responsibility. In other
cases, a discussion with representatives of the af
fected firm of the quality control implications of the
allegations and a review of the findings of the firm’s
most recent peer review are sufficient to give the
Committee assurance regarding the adequacy of the
firm’s quality control system.
If this investigation of the allegations indicates
that there may be serious deficiencies in the design
of, or in compliance with, the firm’s quality control
system, the Committee may order a special review of
those aspects of the firm’s system that, if operating
effectively, ordinarily should prevent or detect defi
ciencies of the type alleged to have occurred. The
Committee considers recent peer review and inspec
tion findings in deciding whether there is a need for a
special review. While it has not yet had the occasion
to do so, the Committee can request authorization
from the Executive Committee to review the audit
workpapers of the specific alleged audit failure.
■ Basis for Closing Individual Files. A file is closed
on a case with respect to the individual firm when the
Committee concludes either that the allegations do
not indicate the likelihood of a deficiency in the firm’s
quality control system, or, if so, that the firm has taken
appropriate action to correct such deficiencies so as
to minimize the possibility of future failure.
If litigation suggests a problem with professional
standards, the matter is referred to the appropriate
standard-setting body of the AICPA.
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in accordance with applicable standards. Such re
views are performed not only to evaluate the
performance on the engagement in question but
also to determine the effectiveness of the firm's
quality control policies and procedures and to
make such changes in them as appear appropri
ate. This latter objective parallels that of the
Committee, namely, that a member firm modify
any aspect of its quality control system if such
modification would be expected to minimize the
possibility of a future engagement not being per
formed in accordance with professional standards.
Corrective actions taken by member firms
during 1984-85, either on their individual ini
tiatives or after discussion with a Committee task
force, included:
■ Reassignment of firm personnel and responsi
bilities.
■ Development and presentation of, or participa
tion in, specified continuing professional educa
tion programs.
■ Closer supervision of, or concurring preissuance
review of, work performed by specified in d i
viduals.
■ Performance of a special internal inspection of
auditing and accounting assignments for clients in
a given industry.

Policy in Closing Cases
As indicated, the Committee closed its
files on 34 cases during the year ended June 30,
1985. A file is closed when the Committee either
(a) concludes that the allegations misstated the
requirements of professional standards or did not
indicate a need for changes in the firm's quality
control system or (b) has obtained assurance that
the firm has strengthened the quality control pol
icies and procedures relevant to the issues in the
case in litigation.

Other Actions Initiated by the Committee
In addition to assessing the allegations ineach case in terms of possible deficiencies in the
reporting firm’s quality control system, the Com
mittee considers whether the cases, either indi
vidually or in the aggregate, indicate a deficiency

in professional standards o r a need for additional
guidance.
Several cases during the past year have
prompted the Committee to refer specific matters
to the profession’s standard-setting authorities:
■ The Auditing Standards Board was asked to
reassess the adequacy of guidance regarding
communications between successor and prede
cessor auditors, especially in situations where the
successor auditor intends to issue an unqualified
opinion on financial statements that contain mate
rial revisions to those opined on by the prede
cessor auditor.
■ Several reported cases dealt with accounting
for costs during construction of nuclear operating
plants by public utilities. A Committee task force
met with representatives of the AICPA Public
Utilities Subcommittee to discuss the financial
problems facing a number of utilities with such
construction projects in progress and their im
plications for accounting and auditing standards.
■ The Committee formally requested the AICPA
Professional Ethics Executive Committee to issue
a ruling as to whether an auditor's independence
is impaired, in fact or in appearance, in a specific
set of circumstances.
Several other issues were informally com
municated at meetings held periodically between
representatives of the Committee and the Audit
ing Standards Board.

SEC Oversight of the Process
In May 1985, at the suggestion of the Board
and others, the Section agreed that the activities
of the Special Investigations Committee should
be reported to the Securities and Exchange Com
mission through the offices of the Board. Although
details of this access arrangement have not yet
been finalized, the SEC is to be provided informa
tion about each closed case that will identify the
company and firm in litigation, summarize the
major allegations in the case, and relate the inves
tigative procedures applied by the Committee,
the results obtained therefrom, and the subse
quent actions taken by the Committee and rea
sons therefor. The SEC staff will also have access to
work programs prepared by the staff of the Board.
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M embership Data
Private Companies Practice Section declined by
ne thousand five hundred forty-nine
66. Details are shown in Table 5.
firms are members of the Division for
The fact that 217 firms withdrew from the
CPA Firms: 393 belong to both the SEC
Division— or had their membership terminated
Practice Section and the Private Com
noncompliance with membership require
panies Practice Section, 10 belong only to thefor
SEC
ments— continues to be a matter of concern. The
Practice Section and 1,146 belong only to the Pri
Board is pleased to note, however, that the
vate Companies Practice Section.
number of firms auditing one or more SEC regis
Membership in the Division continues to
trants declined by only six during the year ended
decline, a trend that has persisted since 1980
June 30, 1985.
when membership reached an all-time high of
Analysis of membership records main
over 2,200 firms. After adjustment for mergers be
tained by the Institute reveals that 103 firms that
tween member firms, the number of firms with
withdrew during the year had undergone one or
membership in both sections declined by 19 dur
more peer reviews during their term of mem
ing the twelve months ended June 30, 1985, and
bership. Eighty-eight of these firms (85%) had rethe number of firms with membership in only the

O
TABLE 5

Analysis of Membership in the Division for CPA Firms by Number of SEC Clients and by Section— July 1, 1984 to
June 30, 1985

Number of Firms Classified by
Firms with and with no
SEC Clients
Firms with one
or more SEC
clients

SECPS-only...............
Both sections...........
PCPS-only.................
T otals...................

7
189
113
309

—

Firms with no
SEC clients
SECPS-only...............
Both sections...........
PCPS-only.................
T otals..................

6
228
1,120
1,354

—

All firms
SECPS-only...............
Both sections...........
PCPS-only.................
T otals..................

13
417
1,233
1,663

—

4
1
5

7
185
112
304

1
20
21

6
227
1,100
1,333

1
4
108
113

—
—

13
412
1,212
1,637

1
8
120
129

—

5
21
26

—

4
12
16

—

(4)
4

—
—

(4)
4

2
5
14
21

—

2
18
176
196

—

4
23
190
217

—

(5)
4
(1)

5
( 4)
1

—
—

5
175
118
298

5
218
1,028
1,251
10
393
1,146
1,549

*Of the five firms that were members of both sections, four merged with other firms that are members of both sections and one merged with a PCPS-only member. Of
the 21 PCPS-only firms that merged, 19 merged with firms that are members of both sections and two merged with other PCPS-only members.
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TABLE 6

Analysis of Membership in the Division for CPA Firms— July 1, 1984 to June 30, 1985
Division for CPA Firms

Classification

No. of firms..............................

]uly 1, 1984

1,637*

June 30, 1985

SEC Practice Section
Increase
(Decrease)

1,549

No. of SEC audit clie n ts.........

11,543

13,070

No. of practice u n its ...............

3,742

3,639

No. of professionals.................

100,846

105,154

(88)
1,527
(103)
4,308

July 1 , 1984

425*
11,366

June 30, 1985

403
12,862

1,974

1,996

85,192

90,044

Increase
(Decrease)

(22)
1,496
22
4,852

*Adjusted for mergers between m em ber firms July 1, 1984 to June 30, 1985.

ceived an unqualified report on their most recent
peer review.
While membership in terms of the number
of firms that belong to the Section declined during
the year, the number of SEC registrants4 audited
by member firms and the number of professionals
employed by member firms continue to increase.
Details are shown in Table 6.

non-SEC registrants caused the Executive Com
m ittee to amend the Section’s membership
requirements.
■ Litigation Reporting Requirement. In April 1985,
the requirement for reporting litigation and cer
tain other proceedings to the Special Investiga
tions Committee was significantly expanded. In
addition to reporting cases alleging deficiencies
in the conduct of an audit of an SEC registrant, a
member firm is now required to report cases alleg
ing deficiencies in the conduct of an audit of the
following "public interest” clients.
A bank or other lending institution that files
periodic reports with the Comptroller of the Cur
rency, the Federal Reserve System, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, or the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board pursuant to section 12(i)
of the Exchange Act.

Auditors of Publicly-traded Companies
Firms that are members of the Division
serve as auditors for the vast majority of com
panies whose stocks are publicly traded. Member
firms audit over 85 percent o f all public companies
listed in the thirteenth edition of Who Audits Amer
ica4. As shown in Chart D, these companies account
for over 98 percent of the aggregate sales volume
of all publicly-traded companies. The majority of
these companies— 78 percent—are audited by
firms that are entitled to a permanent seat on the
Executive Committee of the SEC Practice Section;
these companies account for 98 percent of the
combined sales volume of all publicly-traded
companies.
Members of the Division and their foreign
affiliates audit all but two of the companies whose
stocks are listed on the New York Stock Exchange,
all but 19 of the companies whose stocks are listed
on the American Stock Exchange, and approx
imately 82 percent of the companies whose stocks
are traded "over the counter.”

Changes in Membership Requirements
Public and Congressional interest in in
stances of litigation alleging audit failure involving
4. The num ber of SEC registrants reported by mem ber firms is considerably
larger than the num ber of publicly-held clients listed in Who Audits America.
13th ed. (Menlo Park, Calif: Data Financial Press, 1985). The prim ary reason
for the difference is that Who Audits America generally does not include the
following entities:

A subsidiary or investee of an SEC registrant if
the allegations relate to financial statements pre
sented separately in parent and/or investor com
pany reports.
A company whose financial statements appear
in the annual report and/or proxy statement of an
investment fund because it is a sponsor or man
ager of such fund but which is not itself a registrant
required to file financial statements periodically
with a federal regulatory agency.
■ Other Requirements Applicable to Non-SEC
"Public Interest” Audit Clients. In June 1985, the
Executive Committee further amended the mem
bership requirements to make the following rules
applicable to the types of clients now covered by
the "expanded litigation reporting requirement,”
except for subsidiaries or investees:
•
•
•
•
•

Closely-held oil/gas/real estate partnerships.
W holly owned "financial" subsidiaries.
Employee stock plans.
Foreign based companies.
Companies in bankruptcy.
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□ A partner can serve as audit partner in charge
of such engagement for a maximum of seven con
secutive years.
□ A concurring review of the audit must be per
formed by a partner other than the engagement
partner.
□ Certain management advisory services may
not be performed for such clients that are also
audit clients.
The following matters must be reported to the
audit committee or board of directors of such
clients:
■ The amount of fees received for manage
ment advisory services and the type of such
services.
■ The nature of disagreements with the man
agement of the client on financial accounting
and reporting matters and auditing pro
cedures, which, if not satisfactorily resolved,
w ould have caused the issuance of a
qualified auditor’s report.

Coordinating Committee of the SEC and Private
Companies Practice Sections— had engaged the
public relations firm of Hill & Knowlton to assist in
the development and implementation of a wideranging public information program.
Approximately 60 spokespersons have
been identified and trained in presenting the Di
vision’s message. There are five basic points in
that message:
■ CPAs, as professionals, are committed to ex
cellence.

The Division’s Public Information Program

Information packages have been devel
oped for the media, advertisements have been
run in the Wall Street Journal and the American Banker,
brochures have been developed on the peer re
view process and the significance of membership,
information on the Division has been sent to
about 300 newspapers, editorial briefings have
been conducted with media in major cities and
numerous interviews, usually with articles result
ing, have been held.

In its 1983-84 annual report, the Board
urged the Division to implement "a multi-faceted
program intended to increase membership and
better inform persons both within and outside the
accounting profession about the program and the
commitment to high quality service that mem
bership in the Division represents.” Before the
end of 1984, the Division— acting through the Joint

■ Peer review is proof of that commitment.
■ Peer review reports are available to the public.
■ The business community should know about
the Division’s program, ask firms if they belong,
and review the firm’s peer review results.
■ Division members believe every firm that per
forms audits should have the effectiveness of its
quality control system periodically subjected to
an independent peer review.
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CHART D.

Analysis of Firms that Audit the 10,230 Publicly-traded Companies Listed in the Thirteenth Edition of Who Audits
America

8,030 companies (78.50%) with aggregate sales of
$4,077,464 million (98.09%) are audited by firms with permanent seats on the
SECPS Executive Committee.

573 companies (5.60%) with aggregate sales of
$19,448. million (0.46%) are audited by other SECPS members.

179 companies (1.75%) with aggregate sales of
$2,186 million (0.05%) are audited by PCPS-only firms.

84 companies (0.82%) with aggregate sales of
$43,638 million (1.05%) are audited by foreign firms.

87 companies (0.85%) with aggregate sales of
$1,552 million (0.04%) are audited by firms not identified.

1,277 companies (12.48%) with aggregate sales of
$12,691 million (0.31%) are audited by U.S. firms
not members of the Division.

Number of
Publicly-traded Companies

Annual Sales of
Publicly-traded Companies
(Millions of Dollars )

24

Board Conclusions and Commentary

A s indicated in earlier sections of this re
port, the Board concludes, based on
its oversight activities, that both the
peer review and special investigative
processes are achieving their intended objec
tives. Both are upgrading the quality of accounting
and auditing practice by reviewing the work of
member firms, critiquing it, and compelling firms
to strengthen their procedures where considered
necessary. Both processes have benefited by re
vision of standards and procedures suggested by
reviewers, members of the Section’s committees
and their staffs, and Board members.
Testimony offered at the on-going Con
gressional hearings strongly indicates that the
profession needs to increase the efforts to inform
its various publics about the expanded self-reg
ulatory program and to make clear the difference
between a business failure and an audit failure. In
addition, the hearings suggest that the Section
should reevaluate the policies and procedures
that cause misperceptions or whose objectives
are being misinterpreted.
The profession must address itself to the
problems caused by the changing environment,
which were addressed by Chairman Wood in his
recent address to AICPA Council (see Exhibit 1),
two of which are commented on below.

Price Competition and MAS
The Board, through its oversight programs,
has gained confidence that auditors perform audit
assignments objectively. However, the increasing
emphasis on management advisory services by
member firms causes perception problems that
demand the attention of the profession. The as
sertion is heard with increasing frequency that
auditing is regarded as a commodity and that
some CPA firms quote very low audit fees— i.e.,
use the audit as a "loss leader”— in order to gain
new clients and reap the rewards of profitable

MAS engagements. Moreover, persistent and in
tensive price competition for audit services is in
terpreted by many as proof that the problem is
more than one of perception.
An analysis of fee data reported by the 25
largest member firms reveals that:
■ Four years ago, the range of MAS fees to total
fees was 1 percent to 25 percent and the median
percentage was 10 percent, i.e., half the firms re
ceived total MAS fees that were 10 percent or
more of total fees.
■ Currently, the range of MAS fees to total fees is 1
percent to 38 percent and the median is 13 per
cent, i.e., half the firms received total MAS fees
that are 13 percent or more of total fees.
Thus, while fees for MAS engagements still
represent a modest percentage of total fees, the
trend of MAS fees is upward. The data reported
does not permit a conclusion as to what portion of
MAS fees are received from audit clients; it may
be that a significant portion of MAS fees are for
engagements performed for nonaudit clients. The
Board has suggested to the Executive Committee
that firms be required to report MAS fees in two
classifications: MAS fees from audit clients and
MAS fees from nonaudit clients.
Nevertheless, the perception problem
persists. In its March 1979 report on "Scope of
Services by CPA Firms,” the Board stated its belief
that certain MAS services— for example, those re
lating to the internal accounting control systems of
clients— were natural opportunities of service for
CPA firms to perform. However, it also urged the
profession and individual firms to exercise mod
eration in the expansion of MAS services. It ap
pears that CPA firms continue to expand their MAS
departm ents and now offer services in areas
which may have little or no relationship to the
traditional services performed by auditing firms.
The Board has suggested an independent
study to ascertain the extent to which the larger
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firms have expanded the scope of MAS and how
such expansion has affected the public percep
tion of the auditor and the credibility of the au
ditor’s report.

Opinion Shopping
In the light of the ever-increasing complex
ity of business transactions, it is not uncommon for
management to seek second opinions on how a
certain transaction might be reported in financial
statements. Some managements, more con
cerned with attaining a predetermined financial
reporting objective than with reporting economic
realities, seek an accounting treatment that per
mits them to achieve the predetermined objec
tive. If their auditor does not condone such
treatment, and if accounting literature does not
specifically proscribe such reporting, some man
agements have been known to "shop" for an
auditor who will concur with management’s pro
posed accounting treatment.
The SEC has stated that it believes the
number of companies engaging in "opinion shop
ping” is increasing. In a recently issued accounting
and auditing enforcement release, it warned man
agements of public companies and accounting
firms that such practice "erodes the public’s belief
in the integrity of both the financial markets and
the independent audit function.”
The Board concurs with this view and
Chairman Wood has urged the profession "to snuff
out [this] insidious practice.” Strict adherence to
the AICPA’s Rules of Conduct, which require a
member to consult with the inquirer’s auditor in
such situations so as to be made aware of all the
facts relevant to the opinion requested, should
minimize the number of times that opinion shop
pers are accommodated.

The Board understands that the Section,
based on the report of its Task Force on Profes
sionalism, is considering adoption of several addi
tional membership requirements. One would
require each firm to adopt and publish an indi
vidual code of conduct and require and enforce
adherence to such code. Another proposed re
quirem ent would be the establishment within
each firm of a rule requiring a partner to consult
with appropriate sources within the firm before
expressing an opinion in response to inquiries
about accounting matters that would have a sig
nificant influence on financial statements— re
gardless of whether such opinion is requested by
a client or nonclient—and that such consultation
be adequately documented. Compliance with
these membership requirements would be sub
ject to peer review.
The Board encourages adoption of such
requirements.

Proxy Statement Disclosure re: Auditing Firm
In July 1985, the Securities and Exchange
Commission issued a release that proposes proxy
statement disclosure of whether the registrant’s
auditing firm is a member "of a voluntary selfregulatory organization which has a peer review
program and an independent oversight function,
both of which are subject to review by the Com
mission.” Based on its oversight of the Section’s
program, the Board believes that the peer review
process is constructive and has improved the
quality of accounting and auditing practice of
member firms. Since the Board believes that all
auditing firms, especially those that audit pub
licly-held companies, should subject their quality
control systems to independent review peri
odically, the Board favors adoption of the SEC’s
proposed proxy statement disclosure.
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An Introduction to Board M embers
The Public Oversight Board was first appointed in 1978. Eight persons have served on the
Board since its inception. The following were members of the 1984-85 Board:

ARTHUR M. WOOD, Chairman, is a charter member of the POB and

served as vice chairman from 1982 until 1984. Mr. Wood served as
chairman of the board and chief executive officer of Sears, Roebuck
and Co. from February 1, 1973 until his retirement on January 31, 1978.
He joined Sears in 1946 to organize the company’s law division and
served the company in several other capacities, including secretary,
vice president and controller, territorial vice-president, and presi
dent. He was a director of Sears and several other companies. He
has a distinguished record of public service, including two presiden
tial boards and trusteeships at the University of Chicago, the
California Institute of Technology, the Art Institute of Chicago, and
Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Center in Chicago.

An audit committee of the American corporation should play a major
role in assuring the board of directors— and the shareholders— that the
audit is complete and unfettered by pressure from management. An
audit committee can inform itself of the quality control system of the audit
firm by requesting access to the latest peer review records at the AICPA
offices in

New York. Self-regulation begins at the corporate level.
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A. A. SOMMER, JR., Vice Chairman, joined the Board in 1982 and was

elected vice chairman in March 1985. Mr. Sommer served as
commissioner of the SEC from 1973 to 1976 and is currently a partner
in the Washington, D.C. law firm of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius,
specializing in securities law He is a member of a host of legal and
civic organizations and has actively served such organizations in
various capacities, such as advisor, trustee, and committee chairman
and member. He is a member of several boards of directors and
serves on a number of advisory boards. He is a frequent lecturer on
corporate, securities, and accounting subjects and has authored more
than forty articles which have been published in several prestigious
law reviews and business publications.

There is no foolproof system that will guarantee detection of all errors in a
set of financial statements. However, the fact that an auditing firm has
submitted its quality control system to critical review by peers affords a
higher level of public assurance regarding the quality of its accounting
and auditing services than any other regulatory device we know.

JOHN D. HARPER was a charter member of the Board. Mr. Harper

served as chairman of the board of the Aluminum Company of
America from 1970 to 1975, was chairman of its executive committee
from 1975 until his retirement in 1977, and was a member of its board
of directors until his untimely death. He had recently retired as
chairman of Communications Satellite Corp., was a member of a
presidential commission, several boards of directors, business and
university organizations, and civic and social groups.

The profession should concern itself with maintaining the public's
perception of the independence of the auditor. Continuing expansion
of management advisory services to audit clients can compromise
this perception. The profession should consider moderating principles
and procedures to keep its primary emphasis on auditing
financial statements. Self-discipline and restraint would be the best
remedies.
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MELVIN R. LAIRD became a member of the Board in August 1984.

Mr. Laird served as Representative in the U.S. Congress from
Wisconsin for nine terms, as Secretary of Defense from 1969 to 1973,
and as Counsellor to the President for Domestic Affairs from 1973
through 1974. He is a member of several corporate boards of
directors and over sixty boards of directors of civic organizations. He
has received many honors, including the U.S. Medal of Freedom, the
Order of Merit (Federal Republic of Germany), the Legion of Honor
(France), Man of Year Awards by the American Cancer Society and
National Association for Mental Health, and the Military Order of the
Purple Heart. He currently serves as a senior counsellor for National
and International Affairs for the Reader’s Digest Association.

" The profession, and in particular the Section, need to better articulate the
difference between business and audit failure, or the public— and some
members of Congress as well— will continue to read the newspaper and
magazine accounts of business failures and wonder where the auditors
were."

ROBERT K. MAUTZ joined the Board in 1981. Mr. Mautz is professor

emeritus of the University of Illinois and the University of Michigan.
He is a member of the Accounting Hall of Fame, past president of
the American Accounting Association, and a former editor of the
Accounting Review. He has been awarded the Gold Medal, the AICPA’s
highest honor, and the American Accounting Association’s Outstand
ing Accounting Educator Award. He is a renowned author of
textbooks and technical articles. His list of service contributions
includes member of the AICPA Committee on Auditing Procedure,
AICPA Council and Board of Directors, Commission to Study the
Common Body of Knowledge for CPAs, Cost Accounting Standards
Board, Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council, and chair
man of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board Organization
Committee.

Unlike government regulation, self-regulation, properly performed, assures
continually improving service to the public because its emphasis is on
remedy and prevention.

If is in closer touch with practice, more aware of

changing conditions, and more responsive to the needs of those who use
the service than any other form of regulation can be."
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The Board is deeply indebted to
three distinguished former members:

JOHN J. McCLOY, who served as chairman from inception until his

resignation in early 1984. Mr. McCloy has had an illustrious career and
public service record. He served as Assistant Secretary of War during
World War II, High Commissioner of Germany, president of the World
Bank and chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., and as senior
partner in the New York law firm, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy.
The AICPA has presented its Medal of Honor—the highest award the
accounting profession can bestow on non-CPAs— to Mr. McCloy in
recognition of his significant contribution to the profession and the
public it serves.

RAY GARRETT, JR., who served as vice chairman from inception until

his untimely death in 1980. Mr. Garrett served as chairman of the
Securities and Exchange Commission from August 1973 until October
1975. From 1954 to 1958 he served on the staff of the Commission,
serving for most of that period as director of the Division of
Corporate Regulation. Both prior to and after his tours of duty with
the SEC, he was a partner in the Chicago law firm of Gardner, Carton
& Douglas. He was an active member of the American Bar
Association and served as chairman of several of its committees. In
1976, he was appointed a governor-at-large of the National Associa
tion of Security Dealers and was also a director of the American
Arbitration Association.

WILLIAM L. CARY, who served as a member from inception until his

resignation for health reasons in 1982. Mr. Cary was Dwight Professor
of Law at Columbia University and served as chairman of the SEC
from 1961 to 1964. Previously, he served on the SEC staff and held
other government positions both in this country and abroad. He also
served as counsel to the New York law firm, Patterson, Belknap, Webb
& Tyler, and authored several books on law and government.

E xhibit I
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STATEMENTS IN
QUOTES
What must be done:
a report from the POB
A “bold rethinking o f its role’’
must be undertaken by the
accounting profession ‘‘to restore
public confidence.’’ That message
was delivered to the American
Institute o f CPAs governing
council by Arthur M. Wood,
chairman o f the Public Oversight
Board o f the SEC practice section
o f the AICPA division fo r CPA
firms. Wood discusses specific
areas fo r reconsideration in this
adaptation o f his presentation at
last May's council meeting in
Scottsdale, Arizona.
This is a critical time in the history
of the accounting profession. To be
lieve that the crisis exists because of
the hearings being held by the
House Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations is in my estima
tion a serious error. Congressman
Dingell’s hearings are a symptom,
not a cause. The cause of this crisis
is the fact that investors and deposi
tors are losing faith in the ability of
the accounting profession to per
form the job that has historically
been its unique function: assuring
the integrity of the financial infor
mation on which our capitalistic so
ciety depends.
CPAs are members of a profes
sion that has had a long and honor
able history in this country. They
are critical, indispensable elements
of any economy that depends on pri
vate capital. Without the work they
do, savers would be reluctant to in
vest in private enterprises, particu
larly in equity investments or in any
but the most established enter
prises.
In response to demands made by
society on the profession, it has,
over the years, expended vast
amounts of time and money to ar
ticulate sound accounting principles
that maximize uniformity in ac
counting and comparability among
enterprises. Considerable effort has
been devoted to developing and re
fining auditing techniques and skills

to lend greater credibility to the at
test function and to auditors’ opin
ions.
The Public O versight Board
(POB), which I chair, is one evi
dence of this conscientious effort to
provide the public with the assur
ances they expect from CPAs. I
trust it will not be seen as self-serv
ing if I say that this effort has been
highly successful and is a credit to
the insight and determination of the
leadership that brought the Ameri
can Institute of CPAs division for
CPA firms into existence. We so
testified before Congressman Din
gell’s committee. My belief, shared
by my fellow board members, is
that the peer review system is a suc
cess. It has lifted the quality of audit
practice in this country perceptibly,
and that can be said of the sole prac
titioner as well as of the nation’s
largest accounting firms.
But puzzlingly, notwithstanding
the enormous emphasis placed by
the profession on quality audits,
notwithstanding the creation of the
division for CPA firms, notwith
standing the thousands upon thou
sands of hours that have generously
been given to make this system a
success, the profession is again un
der public scrutiny and is subject to
criticism based on a number of sen
sational, far-reaching and very un
fortunate cases in which the public
accounting profession appears to its
critics and others to have failed its
public responsibility.
It is not my purpose to dwell on
ch arg es cu rre n tly being made
against the profession. Rather, I
would like to express the percep
tions of my fellow board members
and myself about what must be done
if the profession is to regain public
confidence and, in the course of
that, perhaps its own self-confi
dence.
Beyond quality control
and peer review

Let me start with a disquieting ob

servation. As far as we can tell at
the moment, all of the audits under
scrutiny by Congressman Dingell’s
subcommittee, or that are expected
to come under scrutiny, were per
formed by firms that have never re
ceived anything but clean opinions
in their peer reviews. True, some of
those firms have received letters of
comment, but none has received an
adverse or negative opinion.
Why is this disquieting? Because
it demonstrates that, valuable as the
quality control and peer review sys
tems are, they are not guarantees
that a firm always does work in ac
cordance with standards. More im
portant, it suggests that we cannot
take much comfort from the statistic
that the overwhelming majority of
member firms conduct their prac
tices in accordance with the stan
dards established by the AICPA,
the division for CPA firms and the
SEC practice section (SECPS). And
that, in turn, suggests that as we
contemplate changes necessary to
carry out the responsibility placed
on the profession, we should not
limit our horizon to the peer review
system, but rather should look be
yond it and range freely among the
practices that exist in the profes
sion. As we examine those prac
tices, they may suggest some
changes in the quality control sys
tem, but they may also suggest
changes of a more fundamental na
ture.
Restoring public confidence

It was the hope of the profession in
1978 when the division for CPA
firms was founded that if the pro
gram succeeded it would remove
once and for all the prospect of leg
islative controls and be a giant step
in regaining public confidence. Yet
now, less than a decade later, the
profession is once more under
fire— if anything, more intense than
it was subjected to eight years ago.
The repair job cannot be accom
plished this time with a new struc
ture, a new system, a new device. It
can be done only if the profession is
willing to undertake a bold rethink
ing of its role and has the will to
make necessary changes to restore
public confidence in the auditor’s
opinion.
This is already beginning to hap
pen. The AICPA now has a major
effort under way to examine the
long-accepted proposition— long
accepted in the profession but not
by the public—that audits are not
designed or likely to detect fraud.

The public is shocked that man
agement fraud goes undetected by
those best qualified to root it out.
We applaud the effort to examine
this problem undertaken by the In
stitute and other organizations. In
this connection it may be fruitful for
the profession to require the auditor
in each engagement to make a
meaningful assessment of the qual
ity of the internal control system
and to communicate to the audit
committee his or her findings on its
scope, procedures and personnel.
Confidentiality and the SIC

A second area for major reconsider
ation is the confidentiality require
ment imposed on the activities of
the special investigations commit
tee (SIC).
The SIC was established in late
1979. At that time it was universally
believed that the confidentiality
provision had to be incorporated in
the charter document if it was to
gain the support of the majority of
the accounting profession. Thus,
procedures were adopted to ensure
the confidentiality of committee ac
tivities. Other than members of the
SIC and its staff, only the POB has
access to committee proceedings.
The board and the SECPS have
strictly observed the confidentiality
provisions of the SIC charter. How
ever, the price being paid for that
confidentiality is high indeed. As
long as no one outside the commit
tee or the POB knows what the
committee is doing on individual
cases or understands the bases of its
decisions, the self-regulatory pro
gram will never gain the credibility
it deserves.
The POB believes that the Secu
rities and Exchange Commission
should be given access to the SIC
process to permit the SEC to form
an independent opinion about the
process. If this were done, we be
lieve that the SEC would publicly
state, as it has with respect to the
peer review process, that the special
investigative process is effective
and is achieving its intended objec
tive. I am pleased that earnest ef
forts are under way to provide the
commission with the opportunity
for fuller insight into the work of the
SIC; I earnestly hope that they will
culminate in a modus operandi that
will satisfy the legitimate needs of
the SEC and avoid unduly alarming
members of the section.
Can the SIC perform its functions
satisfactorily without some access
to cases in litigation? None of us at
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the POB advocates establishing the
enormous structure that would be
necessary to permit the board or the
SECPS to determine if an individual
or firm had been guilty of miscon
duct in performing an audit. As
members of the board have repeat
edly said, without subpoena power
any such inquiry would pose the
danger of inflicting grave injustice
on persons and firms.
However, that belief does not
justify the continuation of many of
the limitations that surround the ac
tivities of the SIC. Among those
limitations is the one that precludes
the committee, in seeking to deter
mine whether the litigation that oc
casions the inquiry indicates quality
control deficiencies, from making
any investigation of the very audit
that is the subject of the litigation.
This limitation stems, in my estima
tion, from fear on the part of firms
that such an inquiry might in some
fashion prejudice them in litigation,
even though its purpose and thrust
would not be to pass judgment on
the audit.
We have no desire to put the SIC
in the position of determining guilt
or responsibility in individual
cases. We do think it may be neces
sary to permit it to discover what
really occurred with sufficient accu
racy and reliability so it can as
sess the effectiveness of the firm ’s
quality controls in the specific sit
uation that gave rise to the litiga
tion.
Second partner review

Second partner review is another
matter that warrants immediate at
tention. At present, the SECPS’s
membership requirement on second
partner review applies only to audits
of SEC registrants.

It is somewhat difficult to explain
to skeptical congressmen why the
audits of financial institutions
whose recent failures have had vast
repercussions in financial circles
are not co n sid e re d im p o rtan t
enough to be subject to this require
ment of the section. I would think
that the audit of any financial insti
tution or organization of more than
modest size should be subject to the
requirements of second partner re
view, in addition to all other mem
bership requirements applicable to
SEC registrants.
The scope of such review also
should be more precisely defined,
including the requirement that “ key
area” work papers be examined, to
give the firm even greater assurance
that the engagement was performed
in accordance with professional
standards.
“ Opinion shopping” and
bent principles

Another by-product of today’s in
tensely competitive economy is the
tendency of some corporate manag
ers to jettison an auditor thought to
be too conservative or too rigid and
to find one more pliable. No re
spectable professional counten
ances this; still SEC complaints pro
v ide e v id e n c e th a t th e re are
members of the profession who do
not blanch at the opportunity to gain
a client, even if it means bending a
principle.
The ideal solution to this, of
course, is a heightened sense of pro
fessionalism. Sadly, that has not
been sufficient to snuff out the in
sidious practice of “ opinion shop
ping.’’ Thus, I think it is imperative
that the peer review process be
amended to require appropriate

documentation that firms, for first
time audits, made appropriate in
quiry of the predecessor auditor and
examined its work papers, and re
viewers should be perm itted to
make whatever inquiries of the pre
decessor they believe appropriate.
MAS: discipline and restraint

Finally, I call to your attention the
concern of the Dingell committee
about the effect on auditor indepen
dence of the performance of man
agement advisory services for audit
clients. The POB's report on Scope
o f Services by CPA Firms issued in
March 1979 stated:
“ [T ]here is enough concern
about the scope of services in re
sponsible quarters so that the ques
tions cannot be dismissed as a ‘nonproblem.’ The Board believes that
there is potential danger to the pub
lic interest and to the profession in
the unlimited expansion of MAS to
audit clients, and some moderating
principles and procedures are need
ed.”
Apparently, our call for modera
tion has gone unheeded, for we con
tinue to read announcements by
CPA firms offering consulting ser
vices that extend their MAS activi
ties into such areas as consumer re
search, site evaluation, media mar
ket research, distribution planning
and design, store operations, oper
ations im provem ent program s,
manpower planning and control,
materials management— the list
seems endless.
Again, self-discipline and re
straint would be the best remedies;
absent those— and they do appear to
be absent— I would urge that the
POB’s work in the late 1970s in re
viewing this activity be updated.

Reprinted from the August 1985 issue of the Journal of Accountancy

While fees for MAS still repre
sent a modest percentage of total
fees earned by firms, the trend is
clearly in the direction of increasing
reliance on this revenue. We hear
today the assertion that some CPA
firms consider auditing to be a com
modity. They are using the audit as
a “ loss leader” in order to reap the
rewards of profitable MAS engage
ments. The intensive price competi
tion for audit services in which the
profession is now engaged is inter
preted by many as proof that the
assertion must be fact. These per
ceptions demand serious attention
by the profession.
A harbinger of regulation

The members of the POB are fully
committed to the belief that the ac
counting profession and the nation
are best served by a system of self
regulation and that there is no need
for further federal regulation. I
would be less than candid, howev
er, if I did not express our concern
that a failure to come to grips with
the problems discussed above, and
others as well, will be the harbinger
of a measure of regulation that can
only stifle innovation, competition,
opportunity and professionalism.
The profession is divided in its
counsels. It must forego its differ
ences, recognize the crisis and act in
unity to defeat it. We share a con
viction that the solution to the faults
in financial reporting does not lie in
more regulation. The solution lies
within the profession. ■
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SEC PRACTICE SECTION
E x ecu tive C o m m itte e
Firm Affiliation

Member

Price W aterhouse

John W. Zick, Chairm an

*

John D. Abernathy, III

* S eidm an & Seidm an

G eorge L. Bernstein
M ario J. Form ichella

* Laventhol & Horwath
‘ A rth u r Young & C om pany
Baird K urtz & Dobson
* Peat, Marwick, M itc h e ll & Co.

James O. G lauser
C lifford E. Graese
H ow ard G rovem an
Clarence D. H ein
Eli Hoffman
Charles Kaiser, Jr.
R ob ert L. May
J. C urt M in gle
R obert D. N eary
James J. Q uinn
Edw ard A. R einerio
S tanley G. Russell, Jr.
M illa rd E. Sm ith
John A. T ho m pso n
Jack C. W ahlig
M ichael A. W alker
D onald P. Zima

* Alexander G rant & C om pany
Hein + Associates
J. H. Cohn & C om pany
Pannell K err Forster
* A rth u r A ndersen & Co.
C lifton G underson & Co.
* Ernst & W h inn ey
* C oopers & Lybrand
Johnson G rant & Co.
*Touche Ross & Co.
* D e lo itte Haskins & Sells
*K M G M ain H urdm an
* McGladrey, H endrickson

&

Pullen

* Mann Judd Landau
May Zima

&

Co.

* Firm e ntitle d to permanent seat because firm audits 30 or more registrants under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Peer Review Committee

Edward J. O’Grady, Chairman
Thomas E. Byrne, Jr.
Michael A. Conway
Marvin Feller
Robert E. Fleming
David B. Greer
Robert H. Haas
Daniel J. Moylan
David A. Nelson
David B. Pearson
Emile L. Provost, Jr.
Joseph A. Puglisi
Joe D. Ratliff
Prentice N. Ursery
Frank H. Whitehand

Laventhol & Horwath
Price Waterhouse
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
Ernst & Whinney
Urbach Kahn & Werlin, PC
DeMiller, Denny, Word & Co.
Coopers & Lybrand
Deloitte Haskins & Sells
McGladrey, Hendrickson & Pullen
Arthur Young & Company
H. J. Lowe & Company
Touche Ross & Co.
Hollis McClain & Howell, Ltd.
Pannell Kerr Forster
Arthur Andersen & Co.

Special Investigations Committee

Robert A. Mellin, Chairman
Mark J. Feingold
Edwin P. Fisher* * *
John J. Fox*
Gerald E. Gorans
Leroy Layton * * *
Leon P. Otkiss* * *
David Wentworth* * *
Joseph A. Zulfer

Hood and Strong
Laventhol & Horwath
Arthur Andersen & Co.
Coopers & Lybrand
Touche Ross & Co.
KMG Main Hurdman
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
McGladrey, Hendrickson & Pullen
Ernst & Whinney

* etired.
R
*Effective October 1985, these members w ill have exhausted their six-year e lig ib ility for service on the com m ittee in accordance with the section's existing
regulations.
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